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I. INITIAL CONCEPTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this thesis will be on the nature of Soviet
command and control and the implications of that control for
U.S. military planners. Soviet military literature
discusses the "revolution in military affairs" that has
taken place since 1950. In that literature they have
described the revolution as having three distinct phases:
[Ref. 1, p. 114; Ref. 2, p. v; Ref . 3, p. 13]
1. weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons)
2. long range means of delivery (ICBM's)
3. command and control.
These phases are a result of technological advances in
the means of waging war. The first phase eludes to nuclear
weapons. The second phase deals with ICBM's, the method of
long range delivery. The third phase deals with changes in
command and control The importance of considering these
phases is to study and understand the changes in military
operations and warfare that have taken place. In the words
of Soviet Marshal Sokolovskii:
The revolution in military affairs is the reason behind
changes in doctrine and strategy, which will result
shortly in corresponding changes in the operational art
and tactics. [Ref. 3, p. 13]
The politburo and military establishment in the Soviet
Union have used the revolution in military affairs to draw
attention to changes in warfare that have taken place. [Ref.
4, p. 57]
Command and control, the third phase of the revolution,
is now taking place. The first two phases, weapons of mass
destruction and long range means of delivery, have already
taken place, and their implications are known and
established. The Soviets are still trying to adjust to
changes caused by the first two, as is the rest of the
world. Changes taking place in command and control are a
result of the need to adjust to changes in warfare.
The effect nuclear weapons have had on world political
and military affairs has been discussed for years. Now
there is a need to study command and control, the third
phase of the revolution in military affairs in the context
of weapons of mass destruction, to gain an understanding of
their troop control system and how it might be used against
U.S. forces.
An examination must be made of the effects nuclear
weapons and ICBM's have had on command and control, and in
particular, Soviet command and control structure. These
weapons have created the need for the highest level
authority to be in control of the use of certain types of
weapons, namely weapons with nuclear warheads, regardless of
what form they may be in.
B. SCOPE OF THESIS
The theme of this thesis will be the study of the Soviet
command and control structure and organization. The two
phases leading to the present revolution in military affairs
have been mentioned and will be examined as to the effect
they have had on the structure of Soviet command and
control
.
In the author's opinion history must be considered in
studying the current Soviet command and control
organization. The Soviets have relied'on history to
structure their command and control system. [Ref. 5, p. 5]
The writings of Lenin and the study of World War II have
been important sources for Soviet command and control.
With the increased range and kill radius of nuclear and
conventional weapons the time for tactical decision making
and planning of the offensive has been reduced. This has
had an impact on the premise of Soviet combat action: the
offensive and the means of conducting the offensive. It
will be shown that these tactical considerations are the
driving reason behind the Soviet command and control system.
[Ref. 3, p. 38] The fast pace of modern warfare has led to
an increase in the need for flexibility of command decision
making in combat.
Carrying out the offensive requires the coordination of
various supporting arms and forces. Flexibility in the
execution of troop control is needed to properly conduct the
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offensive. The Soviets have designed flexibility into their
command and control structure to control combat action by
using a system of high level staff representatives at the
local level of combat action.
C. HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Soviet command
and control structure is organized to take advantage of the
"power distribution", the power distribution being the
control of the reserves and supporting forces such as
artillery and tanks to conduct offensive action. By
effectively controlling the reserves, and committing them to
the proper breakthrough point, they will be more successful
in combat
.
Control of the reserves is critical because the outcome
of individual combat action on a wide front is of a
stochastic nature. Hence where the breakthrough will occur
on a battlefield cannot be predicted. [Ref. 6, p. 56] When
a breakthrough does occur, it is important to commit the
reserves to the breakthrough point to open the enemy's
defense on a wide scale, an opening the enemy may not be
able to close with all of the reserves. This is what is
meant by the power distribution. As Orr stated in his book,
"Combat Operations C3I: Fundamentals and Interactions", the
power distribution is essentially a measure of potential of
the commander's reserve force. [Ref. 6, p. 57]
Although the Soviets do not use the term "power
distribution" in their military writings, they talk
constantly about the reserves and the breakthrough point,
and forging and opening in the enemy's lines that the enemy
will not be able to close. [Ref. 7, p. 3]
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Soviet command
and control system is organized to take advantage of the
"power distribution" and to control it. While their command
and control structure is highly centralized, decision making
is executed at the local level for control of the reserves.
[Ref. 8, p. 1816] One possible reason for being structured
in a centralized manner was mentioned above: to control the
power distribution by executing decision making at the local
level. However, there are other reasons not fully explained
or discussed in Soviet military writings. Some reasons that
have been recognized are the spatial nature of the
battlefield, tactical nuclear weapons, the decreased time
factor for decision making, and the information that must be
considered. [Ref. 3, p. 4]
Further possible reasons for a centralized structure
include the following:
a) The breakthrough may not occur in one area, or in the
area of a single decision maker. If it occurs in an
area of responsibility of two commanders, commitment
of the reserves, coordinating action, and supporting
fire would require additional planning time and may
delay or miss the exploitation of the opportunity to
breakthrough
.
b) If the breakthrough occurs in one area, it is possible
that the size of the breach may be too large, or the
10
troops needed to fully exploit it may not be
available. In short, a single commander may be in a
situation where he does not have the requisite
reserves to fully exploit the breakthrough. This
would require the commander to obtain reserves from
other commanders on the same level as himself. While
this is possible, the other commander would be more
likely to hold his reserves in his sector, under his
command, in order to exploit the breakthrough in his
own sector when it occurred. A senior commander at
the local level would have the authority to coordinate
forces from other areas to exploit the breakthrough.
[Ref. 9, p. 287]
c) The commander in whose area the breakthrough occurs
may not recognize the breakthrough when it happens.
Commanders can easily become bogged down in matters
not directly related to battle: day-to-day operations
of the command, troop morale, logistics, and other
related matters. These details are important to
running the command and to success in battle, but they
can tax the commander's time and decrease the time
that is spent on planning for the offensive. The time
available for the evaluation of information about the
battle is thus decreased. Probably the most striking
reason for the commander not recognizing the
breakthrough point is lack of understanding, or
knowledge about the total war effort. The commander
is aware of the situation, requirements, and
objectives of this area and possible adjacent areas.
How the total war effort is tied together may not be
obvious to him. What may not seem as a breakthrough
point to exploit to a lower level commander, may
appear as an obvious point of attack to a higher level
commander from the General Staff, who has a global
view of the war.
D. CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Soviet command
and control system is organized to control the power
distribution. The three points mentioned above—location of
the breakthrough, size of the reserves needed to exploit the
breakthrough, and recognition of the breakthrough point
—
relate to the hypothesis in that a highly centralized
11
organization is best suited for coping with these three
uncertainties of war. Chapter II will explore Soviet
command and control in depth and define command and control
from a Soviet perspective and in the context of their
culture. Chapter III will discuss Soviet tactics, doctrine,
and their requirements for the offensive. Chapter IV will
examine the Soviet troop control structure and how it is
organized. Throughout, the critical point of Soviet troop
control is that it is highly centralized, but decision




II. SOVIET TROOP CONTROL
A. SOVIET PERCEPTIVE ON TROOP CONTROL
The Russian culture must be understood to gain an
understanding of the Soviet command and control structure.
To do a study of Soviet troop control it must first be
approached from the Russian point of view, because to do
otherwise would lead to the wrong interpretation. [Ref. 3,
p. 10] The Soviets know that there is a difference in
eastern and western thought. As former Soviet Army Colonel
Alge Penkovskiz, who turned over a large volume of Soviet
military writings to the British in I960, wrote:
One thing must be clearly understood. If someone were to
hand to an American General, an English General, and a
Soviet General the same set of objective facts and
scientific data, with instructions that these facts and
data must be accepted as unimpeachable, and an analysis
made and conclusions drawn on the basis of them, it is
possible that the American and the Englishman would reach
similar conclusions, I don't know. But the Soviet General
would arrive at conclusions which would be radically
different from the other two. This is because, first of
all, he begins from a different set of basic premises and
preconceived ideas, namely, the Marxian concepts of the
structure of society and the course of history. Second,
the logical process in his mind is totally unlike that of
his western counterparts, because he uses Marxist
dialects, whereas they will use some form of deductive
reasoning. Third, a different set of moral laws governs
and restricts the behavior of the Soviet. Fourth, the
Soviet General's aim will be radically different from
those of the American and the Englishman. [Ref. 10, p. 13]
An understanding of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is
needed to appreciate the Soviet view. For the Marxist-
Leninist philosophy explains the world for the Soviets, and
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it is the view of the world that is officially adopted by
the Soviet Union. [Ref. 10, p. 15] Prof. James G. Taylor
offers an explanation of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
Marxist-Leninist philosophy holds matter (i.e., the
material world) as primary and consciousness as secondary.
Matter exists independently of human consciousness and is
governed by laws. These laws are in principle cognizable
by man, we can recognize them with the help of practical
action. Thus, the Soviets believe in the dialectical unit
of theory and practice, theory guides practice and
practice validates theory.
Moreover, the laws of materialistic dialectics are
considered by Marxist-Leninist philosophy to be the most
general laws describing the evolution of the material
world. Not only do they apply to the material world, but
through the process of reflection by the human mind they
apply to human thought (dialectical logic) and human
knowledge. Hence, the Soviets believe that the laws of
materialist dialectics also apply to the command decision
making process. [Ref. 10, p. 16]
It is not the purpose of this thesis to explain all of
the principles behind dialectic materialism, but the Marxist
Leninist philosophy is supported by the dialectic
materialism, and it is the Marxist-Leninist view that gives
the Soviets their understanding of the world.
The military potential of a country can be measured in
the size of its army, navy, and economic base. The Soviets
feel that their troop control structure is part of their
nation's military potential. During war the potential of a
command and control system can be measured by success or
failure in combat. In peacetime the Soviets measure the
potential of their troop control system by the readiness of
troops to conduct wartime operations. [Ref. 10, p. 4]
Higher combat potential of a troop control system comes from
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the ability to make a quicker and more accurate decision
about a combat situation. A superior command and control
system may serve as a force multiplier, compensating for
weakness in other areas. [Ref. 11, p. 4]
B. DEFINITION OF TROOP CONTROL
The Soviets have defined troop control in their Military
Encyclopedic Dictionary as follows:
Troop control is the activity of commanders of
operational level units (tactical-level units, or any
other type of troop unit), staffs, political organs,
departments, and other control organs on maintaining
constant combat readiness of their troops, preparing
operations and tactical actions, and directing troops for
the carrying out of assigned missions. It includes:
(1) continuous receipt, collection, study, representa-
tion, and analysis of data concerning the situation
(2) making a decision about the operation (tactical
action
)
(3) disseminating missions to subordinate troops
(4) planning the operation (tactical action)
(5) organizing and maintaining mutual support
(6) preparing troops and staffs for combat operations
and directing them directly
(7) organizing and carrying out measures on party-
political work and all types of support
(8) creating a system of trop control
(9) organizing the monitoring and giving assistance to
commanders of subordinate operational level units,
staffs, and troops.
Troop control is carried out personally by the
commander of the operational-level (tactical-level) unit
through his staff, and also through his deputies and the
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chiefs of branches of troops, special troops, and services
in accordance with the orders, directives, and
instructions of superiors. The basis of troop control is
the decision of the commander of the operational-level
unit (tactical-level unit, or any other type of troop




(2) centralization of control is all component elements,
with retention by subordinates of the possibility to
show initiative in determining the means of carrying
out the mission assigned to them
(3) firmness and persistence in carrying out the
decisions that have been made by superiors
(4) timely reaction to changes in the situation
(5) continuity and security
(6) personal responsibility of the commander for the
decision that is made, use of subordinate troops,
and the results of carrying out the mission assigned
to them
For putting troop control into practice one creates a
control system that includes:
(1) organs of control
(2) points of control
(3) a communication system
(4) automated systems of troop control, and
(5) other special systems. [Ref. 12, p. 766]
What the Soviets require of their troop control is that
it be flexible, organized to carry out the combat mission,
and that the commander take an active role in the
implementation of the combat plan and monitoring of actions
by subordinates.
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C. PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET TROOP CONTROL
To carry out troop control as defined above, the Soviets
have stated principles for their troop control system and
the commander to meet. These include centralization,
flexibility, firmness, checking of the execution,' and
continuous troop control. Each will now be discussed
because they show how the Soviets put their definition and
requirements for troop control into practice.
By taking advantage of advances in technology, the
Soviets have been able to centralize more of their command
structure on a broader scale. Colonel General G. Vorontsov
described it in this way:
The principle of centralization, the essence of which
is that lower echelon control bodies strictly fulfill the
orders, directives, and instructions of the higher bodies
and report on their activity and on the actions and
efficiency of troops subordinated to them. At the same
time the centralization practiced in the Soviet armed
forces provides the possibility for subordinate echelons
of command to display the necessary initiative and
independence in action for the better fulfillment of the
assigned mission. [Ref. 13, p. 39]
For the Soviets, centralization of their troop control
allows for flexibility and swiftness in combat. Flexible
troop control to the Soviets means quick reaction to changes
in the combat situation. Flexibility includes the timely
specification or changing of an order already given, and
precise assignment of new combat missions to subordinate
commands. [Ref. 14, p. 23] The purpose of flexibility to the
Soviet is for the right troops to be in the right place at
17
the right time. Flexibility is a Soviet requirement for
strategic conventional war.
Firmness of troop control implies a persistent
implementation of the decision made by the commander. The
Soviets see the need for firmness in that actions on the
battlefield do not always proceed as planned. But with the
firmness of troop control by the commander, a method and way
for the implementation of a backup plan will be found. [Ref.
14, p. 23] Firmness is maintained by a continuous checking
of the execution and actions of subordinates. [Ref. 13, p.
39]
Checking the execution of orders given to subordinates
is done by receiving continuous reports on the combat
situation. The commander, as the controlling organ, cannot
make adjustments to or maintain control of combat without
feedback on the progress of failure of assigned missions.
[Ref. 15, p. 14] If feedback fails, the commander will no
longer be in control.
Continuous troop control is the commander's constant and
effective influence on the progress of subordinates
completing assigned combat missions. [Ref. 14, p. 24] To be
able to influence the outcome of battle, the commander must
have full knowledge of the tactical situation as it is
developing. To accomplish continuous troop control the
commander must maintain reliable communications with
subordinate commands.
18
The Soviet commander is solely responsible for
implementing the principles of troop control and for the
actions of those subordinate to him in implementing the
principles of troop control.
D. CONCLUSION
The principles of troop control, centralization,
flexibility, firmness, checking of the execution, and
continuous troop control are all tied to one another by the
need for control of troops under conditions of uncertainty.
Together, they complement each other and give the Soviets
the necessary leadership which they believe will ensure
victory over their enemies in combat. [Ref. 14, p. 24]
This chapter has discussed Soviet troop control from
their cultural perspective and has defined Soviet
requirements for a troop control system and the commander to
carry out. Chapter III will examine Soviet tactics and the
offensive, the premise of their combat doctrine.
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III. SOVIET TACTICS AND DOCTRINE
A. THE OFFENSIVE
Soviet military theorist have identified four basic




4) withdrawal. [Ref. 5, p. vii
]
The study of world military history by the Soviets has
proved to them that of the four types of combat action only
the offensive will yield the destruction of the enemy's
means of conducting war. Hence, success in combat can only
come from employment of the offensive. In the winter of
1941/42 with Moscow under siege the Soviets launched a
counterof fensive to turn back the Germans. [Ref. 7 , p. 8]
By choosing the offensive the Soviets are putting the enemy
on the defensive and making the enemy fight a tactical
combat action from which victory cannot be attained.
The advantage of the offensive position is that the





4) time of attack
5) method of attack.
While troops in the defensive position must guard many
areas along a front, the attacker can choose the area to
launch his strike against. The aggressor can select the
axes of attack that have the highest chance of being
successful. [Ref. 7, p. 2]
"The offensive, however, is only possible after the
breakthrough has been obtained, the breakthrough leads to
the offensive. If the breakthrough is not accomplished the
entire offensive would come to a halt. [Ref. 5, p. 13]
B. THE BREAKTHROUGH
The breakthrough point is that point along a front where
defensive forces are destroyed to a degree that they are no
longer able to hold their position, and hence must withdraw
and reestablish their line of defense. The breakthrough
point is also that sector along the front of offensive
action where the aggressor forces the attack and masses
troops for advance into the enemy's territory.
Obtaining a breakthrough in the enemy's defense is
necessary to lead to offensive action, and to maintain the
offensive attack. As A. A. Sidoreko, a well-known Soviet
author on military tactics wrote:
If for some reason the breakthrough could not be
accomplished, then the entire offensive operation died
down regardless of how well the subsequent stages for its
development were worked out and thought through. [Ref. 5,
p. 13]
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The point of breakthrough is a result of the stochastic
nature of combat. Once it has occurred there must be a
proper selection of the axed of advance to exploit the
breakthrough and maintain the offensive.
The selection of the main axes of advance involves many
factors. During World War II the most vulnerable point in
the enemy's main force was generally the point of attack. In
most cases the Russians choose the main axes of advance such
that it will lead to the rapid defeat of the enemy and
decrease the stability of the enemy's troops along the
front. [Ref. 7, p. 155]
In selecting the axes of advance, a large consideration
to the Soviets is the mission to be accomplished. Other
factors in the selection of the axes are geography, time of
the attack, and the composition of enemy forces. [Ref. 7, p.
154]
Lenin stated that to be successful in combat it is
essential to have superiority of forces over the enemy at
the decisive point and at the decisive time. [Ref. 7, p.
154] Massing of forces at the breakthrough point is
essential to the conduct of the offensive. The massing of
forces is the control of the power distribution. The
increased mobility of Soviet troops aids them in the massing
of forces, but the proper massing of forces will always be a
coordination problem and hence a troop control problem.
22
For the breakthrough to be successful there must be
reserves to commit to the breakthrough point at the correct
time. Victory can only come from offensive action,
offensive action is only possible with the breakthrough
along the front; and the breakthrough can only occur with
coordinated reserves to obtain superiority of forces over
the enemy.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
The use of more technical and various types of weapons
in combat, as well as the use of specialized troops has
complicated the coordination effort of modern combat. With
the changes in warfare has come the need for changes in
troop control. Centralization of troop control is used by
the Soviets, especially in the planning for the offensive.
[Ref. 5, p. 38] With centralized control the Soviets are
able to control the reserves more effectively in battle.
The Soviets have outlined the requirements for a
successful offensive and breakthrough:
1) preparation
2) planning
3) intelligence on the enemy
4) skillful employment of troops
5) firm, flexible, and continuous troop control. [Ref.
7, p. 74]
To the Soviets, the out come of battle is not only
determined by control of the reserves and massing of troops,
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but also by the quality of combat preparation, effective
troop control, and coordination among combat arms. [Ref. 7
,
p. 159]
What the Soviets have done is to tie their tactics for
success in combat to their troop control structure. They
require flexibility in their troops for action on a front,
and they have designed their troop control structure to give
them that needed flexibility in combat. The Soviets believe
that the organization and execution of the offensive cannot
be separated from the commands and staffs that support and
direct troop control functions. [Ref. 5, p. 3] The Soviets
have made their command and control structure a bona fide
force multiplier.
D. CONCLUSION
As discussed the Soviet troop control system is highly
centralized for control of the reserves at the breakthrough
point. The flexibility in their tactics comes from having
high-level representatives at the local level of decision
making. Chapter IV will examine their troop control
structure and how it is organized to give them flexibility
in the massing of forces, control of the reserves and for
carrying out battle plans.
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IV. SOVIET TROOP CONTROL STRUCTURE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the command and control
structure of the Soviet military command decision-making
bodies. To prove the hypothesis, that the Soviet troop
control system is designed to control the power
distribution, the composition of the Soviet Defense Council,
Supreme High Command (SHC), and the process of staff
representatives at the front, army, and division level will
be examined. World War II examples will be used to show how
the Soviets achieve flexibility and control of the power
distribution with a centralized command structure.
Section B will define the Soviet territorial structure
of command. Section C will examine the Soviet command
organization. Section D will show how their tactics are
related to their command system for control of the reserves.
B. TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE OF COMMAND
The Soviets believe a war could breakout at any time and
at any place in the world and train to fight this kind of
war. For this reason they have divided up the world into
"military-geographical" zones. These zones are called TVD '
s
(teatr voyennykh deystviy), which translates into Theater of
Strategic Military Action (TSMA). A TSMA includes the
following:
25
Part of the continental territory with its coastal
waters, inland seas and airspace (continental TSMA) , or
the water areas of one ocean, including islands, adjoining
seas and coastal land belts (oceanic TSMA) within the
boundaries of which strategic groupings of armed forces
may be deployed and military operations carries out. [Ref.
8, p. 1813]
This is not to imply that there are always troops and
naval forces stationed in a TSMA. During World War II there
was an instance where there were three CINC (Commander in
Chief) operating in one TSMA. [Ref. 8, p. 1816] This point
is important in understanding that a CINC is different from
a theater. While a CINC would be in command of forces, a
territory holds different meaning to the Soviets. The CINC
has a military command not a territory command, which means
his forces can conduct operations across a theater. This
can result in more than one commander in the same geographic
area. This point was mentioned in Chapter I in regard to
the breakthrough point occurring in the area of more that
one commander.
Soviets coordinate most of their operational planning
for the theater level of conflict. Within a geographic
sector they plan combat on four levels:
1) strategic military action in a theater
2) strategic direction
3) operational direction
4) zone of advance. [Ref. 9, p. 282]
This planning is a continuous process. It is done in
peacetime and continues throughout the conflict. During
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peacetime the planning would include construction of roads,
airfields, supply stations, and radar sites to name a few.
As tensions increase, troops would be forward deployed to
hot spots. With troops on station they would be able to
carry out operational plans at the outbreak of fighting,
thus gaining the initiative. [Ref. 16, p. 283]
Each TSMA contains at least one strategic direction (a
strategic direction being a sector or axes of advance),
which would lead the Soviet forces to the economic and
political control centers of their enemy. The sector
includes land, air, and any waterways that may enhance the
advance. The strategic direction would be undertaken by
combined forces on a front.
Contained within each strategic direction is one or more
operational directions. An operational direction may be
defined as the land, air space, and waterways where
operational strategic formations conduct battle. [Ref. 9, p.
283] The zone of advance would include the breakthrough
point discussed in Chapter III.
C. SOVIET COMMAND ORGANIZATION
To fully understand Soviet troop control it is necessary
to be aware of the various command decision-making bodies
and their composition. At the highest level is the council
of defense which is comprised of the following members:
1) General Secretary CPSU
2) Minister of Defense
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3) Chief of the General Staff
4) Chairman KGB
5) Chairman council of Ministers of the USSR
6) Other party and state officials as required. [Ref. 9,
p. 280]
The Council of Defense has complete and absolute control
over the military and economic direction of the USSR. The
General Secretary heads the Council of Defense as well as
the SHC, or Stavka as the Soviets refer to it. The Council
of Defense plans for the mobilization of the country's
industry, manpower, and transportation. Figure 4.1 [Ref.
9] shows the composition of the Council of Defense and the
SHC. The council of defense is there to unify military and
civilian leaders to ensure the proper political direction
for the military.
The SHC shown in Figure 4.1 is subordinate to the
council of defense. In peacetime the SHC is referred to as
the Main Military Council and is responsible for the
strategic direction and leadership of all Soviet armed
forces
.
The General Staff below the SHC is referred to as the
working organ of the SHC. [Ref. 9, p. 286] The Soviets have
never revealed the organization or members of their General
Staff, although it is the largest of the main staffs. What
is known about the General Staff is that it is comprised of
officers from all services, however they do not represent





Ministers of the USSR






Chief of the General Staff
First Deputy Minister of
Defense
Chief of Main Political
Directorate
CINC of Soviet Services
GENERAL STAFF
Working Organ of SHC
Figure 4.1 Composition of Soviet Council of Defense and SHC
29
The function of the General Staff is to analyze military
and political situations as they develop, and to formulate a
unified strategy which applies to all services and the
national interest. They insure that coordinated action will
occur from other various service staffs and from commanders.
[Ref. 17, p. 55] The staff has a military as well as a
civilian responsibility and is given the power to develop
military doctrine and policy of the CPSU.
For flexibility the SHC can create a high command (GK)
under their control for special and unique military
situations. GK translates to "organ of strategic command
and control". The GK is a command which coordinates forces
in wartime. The GK can control a large amount of area or a
narrow sector. Regardless of the amount of land covered the
GK is a military command and not a territory command. The
GK is a staff and has no troops or supplies attache to it.
[Ref. 8, p. 1818]
The High Command of Forces (HCOF) in a TSMA is the level
where detailed planning for front operations would be
carried out.
The various command decision making bodies have been
examined. The next section will show how the Soviet high
level commands are organized to conduct combat operations
and control the reserves.
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D. CONTROL OF THE RESERVES
The Soviets feel that the fast pace of the next war will
be such that they will not have the opportunity to
reorganize their command and control system as they did in
World War II. Believing this, the Soviets use the same
command and control structure for fighting a nuclear and
conventional war. [Ref. 9, p. 286]
As seen in Chapter III on tactics, Soviets feel the
critical element of battle to be the concentration of forces
at the breakthrough point at the proper time.
In the opinion of the Soviet leadership the next war
will move much more rapidly that previous ones, loss of
communications at all levels will be common, and crises
will arise constantly. The importance of flexibility in
strategic command and control will grow, as will be the
necessity of being able to untie at a decisive moment
various types of forces under the command of a commander
with full power and knowledge of local circumstances. It
is impossible to predict where or when a decisive moment
will arise. Therefore it is considered better to keep a
top marshal in Moscow, free of minor concerns, giving him
the opportunity to follow events on a world wide scale and
to be abreast of all Soviet preparations. [Ref. 8, p 1818]
In view of what was presented earlier on the control of
the reserves, this is nothing more than Orr ' s control of the
power distribution, discussed in Chapter I. As has been
shown, tactics drive their command and control structure.
To obtain the needed flexibility in combat the Soviets
use a system of staff representatives for control in battle.
Figure 4.2 shows the system of staff participation in

































1) the SHC can exercise direct control over action on a
front
2) a SHC representative can temporarily take over command
of a front
3) an intermediate organ of strategic command and control
could be created (GK). [Ref. 8, p. 1816]
For example, in World War II the Soviets used staff
representatives to control combat:
At decisive moments of the war Stalin would send a top
ranking representative to the decisive place with
unlimited power. Thus the local Soviet commander had a
deputy of the Soviet Supreme Command at his side during a
crises. In this way the experience and detailed knowledge
of the local commander was reinforced by the wider overall
view and full powers of the Supreme command. [Ref. 8, p.
1118]
In combat, when decisions are time critical, a local
commander would not have to call Moscow for advice or
instructions, he would have a staff representative from the
SHC on the scene. This method of staff representatives is
what is meant when stated that the Soviet command and
control system is highly centralized, with decision making
executed at the local level for flexibility and control of
the reserves.
The staffs not only aid local commanders in making
military decisions, they also are present to insure that the
plans of the SHC are being carried out. The Soviets feel
that this type of centralized control increases the
flexibility of combat forces to respond in a timely manner
to sudden developments on the battlefield.
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E. CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Soviets are
organized for control of the power distribution. it was
stated that the possible reasons for this organization was:
1) Will the breakthrough or decisive point be in an area
under the command of a single commander?
2) Does the commander have the reserves to exploit the
breakthrough?
3) Does the commander recognize the breakthrough?
These three point mentioned above have been shown in
this thesis to be major concerns of Soviet military
planners. The research has shown that their tactics and
troop control system is designed to compensate for the
stochastic nature of combat and the control of the reserves.
The implications for U.S. military planners lays in the
area of command and control counter measures. Using the
work done in this thesis as a base, additional study can be
conducted to determine how to affect their troop control
system. The principles of command and control counter
measures call to induce uncertainty, increase the time for
decision making, and delay the employment of reserves at the
breakthrough point.
For the U.S. to disrupt control of those forces or
attacking of those forces before they could be employed
would be a strategy to be used.
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APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS
CINC COMMANDER IN CHIEF
CPSD COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
C3I COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE
GK HIGH COMMAND
HCOF HIGH COMMAND OF FORCES
ICMB'S INTER CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
KGB SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SHC SUPREME HIGH COMMAND
TSMA THEATER OF STRATEGIC MILITARY ACTION
TVD SAME AS TSMA (teatr voyennykh deystviy)
USSR UNION OF THE SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS
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